Blinkered Partisans, the Enemy of the Public Good

This blog is titled "Eugene Forsey Liberal" since that best explains my politics, and my respect for a man who understood that premises lead to conclusions. Forsey left the NDP in 1961 when they engaged in "a denial of the existence of the Canadian nation founded by the Fathers of Confederation", deleted the word "national" from their policy, preferring to engage in "hemi-demi-semi-separatism", preferring to see a "bi-national" state, in Forsey's prescient words: "letting loose a devil, and that they had not the faintest idea of the consequences of their actions."

Forsey understood, as did and does every thinking federalist and separatist, notably those from Quebec, ranging from Claude Morin and Parizeau to Pierre Trudeau and Marchand, that there were two ways to attempt to deconstruct Canada. One was through a clear and open democratic process, a referendum. The other was to engage in Morin's "étapisme", through general decentralisation, and when that failed, making special deals for Quebec that did not necessarily bear any relation to the best interests of the citizenry, but proceeded from nationalist premises, unconsciously grounded in romanticism's mystical evocation of the nation as the legitimate source of political action, rather than liberalism's individuals or marxism's proletariat or and social-democracy's mediation of the two, the individual in the collective, but the collective the product of individuals. The Morin plan anticipates making Canada into a "coquille vide", or "hollow shell", within which Quebec is basically fully autonomous. At such a point, formal independence need only be a formality, as Canada would have renounced itself as a coherent nation, though some in this camp think that independance under such conditions would be redundant, not to mention costly, given the transition costs.

Many Quebeckers and many Canadians outside Quebec are unconscious separatists in this regard, as their inchoate desire for constitutional peace leads them to unconsciously advocate the Morin plan, from the PLQ in Quebec to the NDP outside, and the Conservatives mostly, now, and Martin and Ignatieff introduced a variant of this strain into the last somewhat federalist party in the country, the PLC.

Their incoherent proposals for, among others, "asymmetric federalism", their hypocrisy in loudly defending the rights of minorities and defending multiculturalism outside Quebec contrasted with their readiness to acquiesce in, even advocate, discriminatory policies against minorities within Quebec, are notably shameful. But they are much more than that, much worse than that. They are stupid and counterproductive, ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT REASONING.

If you go back and read through the arguments between separatists in the 1960s and 1970s over the right strategy to take, separatism by stages or a referendum, and since, you will be struck by their Canadian patriotism. Yes, Canadian patriotism.

Separatists recognised from the beginning that the more "asymmetric" the federalism, the more hollow Ottawa's shell through decentralisation, the more dysfunctional the federation as a whole, which would negatively affect Quebeckers as well as all Canadians. There is a profound moral question, which decent, serious revolutionaries have always confronted: to what extent do my ends justify my means? In the Quebec case, many of the policies whose aims were laudable, the protection and promotion of French and French Canadian culture, were poorly drafted and implemented, as many other psycho-political factors were in play, such as the need for national affirmation, "revanchardisme", or a psychological need for visible signs of franco dominance and hence, logically, anglo inferiority, etc.. Some of those involved in the making and implementing of these policies thought, or at least told themselves and their friends (they may have been lying to themselves), that they themselves did not necessarily feel such needs, but it had to be done to comfort the people,, strengthen their self-image, etc..

Bill 101, the revision of the names of towns and villages, the reduction in availability of english services in the public sector, in the City of Montreal where most lived and live, etc., may have had noble objectives in the abstract, but the unnecessary harshness of the policies as written and implemented did not simply alienate and harm anglophones, it did grievous harm to all of Quebec, notably poor francophones, who were the most affected by the uniquely long recession Quebec suffered as a result, lasting from the 1973 oil crisis and introduction of language laws, to just after the 1995 referendum, when a combination of Dion-Chrétien's Clarity Act (which the NDP now wishes to repeal, after having voted for it) and the LPC's economic policy, and the Bouchard Government's effective governance as well as management of social relations (whatever errors he may have made), combined to lift Quebec out of recession for the first time in 20+ years, and Quebec has prospered ever since, more or less.

What any decent separatist or federalist realises is that asymmetric federalism creates an incoherence within the federation that makes it more dysfunctional by the day. And if you do some research you'll find that separatists worried about this a lot in the 1960s and 1970s, and since, though less. They were patriotic enough as Canadians, decent enough as human beings, to wonder how they could justify to themselves harming the overall working of the federation, and its cumulative effects over time, with all that implies for the most vulnerable in society. For mark this, public policy is a matter of life and death, and bad or sub-optimal policies quietly, invisibly, knock years off lives, when they don't kill them earlier outright. And of course, the effects of sub-optimal or bad policies, or the absence of good ones, affect society on a sliding scale: the rich and upper-middle classes hardly at all, the middle class some, the lower-middle class a lot, the working class and poor enormously. The rich lose few lives, and few years of their lives, to bad public policy, the poor are devastated by it.

The excessively coercive provisions of the language and Quebec nationalist policies of the 1970s, and the referendums and their spectre, by encouraging the exodus of hundreds of thousands of the society's most productive citizens, the slower private investment as compared to others, etc., deepened the recession and prolonged it for 20+ years, quietly devastating the very East End Montrealers and working classes in the regions the policies' drafters went into politics to help.

Similarly, the cost of the Layton NDP's obsession with trying to replace the LPC has been paid by the millions of women, poor, and aboriginals who would have profited from the Kelowna Accord and the Child Care Agreement, approved by NDP premiers, but disappeared now as a result of Layton's 2006 unprincipled opportunism, quite apart from all the harm the vulnerable have suffered as a consequence of the Harper government the NDP brought to power.

The enthusiasts of "asymmetrical federalism" and "special status" provisions for Quebec are blind to their harm to the federation and its citizens for reasons most normal and natural. They are, like many of us, given to considering situations from an optimistically static perspective, instead of considering the dynamic effects of such policies.

What "hard-core" separatists and federalists both understand is that there is no lasting peace to be had through incoherent fictions and arrangements. Some 30% of Quebeckers will remain separatists for the forseeable future, and while they may agree to, even vote for, some momentary federal arrangements they feel help "Quebec" (if not Quebeckers), they will always push for more, they will always want more, which only makes sense: they are separatists. And given this core will always be pushing away, it will have a determinative impact on Quebec society unless the some 30% of hard-core federalists push back, not just in negative resistance, but in promoting an alternative positive vision, grounded in our history, of Canadian federalism and the need to engage within it, in a fair-play manner (if not fair-play, one's interlocutors will not take one's position seriously, hence the problem separatists have in making Quebeckers' case to The Other Provinces And Territories, or TOPATS.)

Quebec commentators often cite the ni-oui, ni-non, soft-nationalist/soft-federalist middle as the decisive majority in Quebec, but it is not, being only a plurality, and the real decisive majority is the 60+% who are coherent, whether federalist or separatist. In truth, there is the majority of the Cohérents, and the minority of the Incohérents (Parizeau once had a rather disrespectful and rude, though true, comment, on the undecided on the "national question", something like, they've only had 50 years to think about it and they're a bunch of imbeciles if they haven't decided yet).

So it is that all the hopes for constitutional peace through some or another incoherent fudge are in vain. There is no constitutional peace to be had, it is a mirage. Its advocates always speak as though just this deal, or that deal, or this arrangement, or that arrangement, will settle the question once and for all. As I say, they ignore that on Day 2 of any agreement, the whole push-pull dynamic will start again. Anyone who knows separatists respects their seriousness enough to get this, and I would hope they understand the same of their federalist friends.

The whole point of these appeals to soft-nationalists, through various incoherent fudges, is to achieve peace, and thus a better functioning federation, with better results for Canadians. But since that approach ignores the dynamic viewpoint, the cost to the functioning of the Federation as the incoherences are exposed, as they slow down effective operation of public policy, and the subsequent conflicts on these self-same matters. The logic of asymmetric "federalists" is one of peace and functionality, but since time does not stop, they are only in fact deepening and prolonging the problems, hurting Canadians more than they help them.

The 1960s and 1970s separatists understood this, why is it that some supposed federalists, like the NDP, do not? The majority of separatists decided on the need for a clean break, so as to avoid hurting Quebeckers and all Canadians, contrary to Morin's desire to poison the federation from within. As Quebeckers could not be convinced to endorse independence, separatists have largely adopted the nationalist position on asymettrical federalism and the transfer of powers, special status, etc., understandably enough, though they remain unhappy about it, understanding its consequences. What Quebec and Canada need are for federalists to be federalists, and counter this noxious influence. The Incohérents do not understand the harm such a position does, though Separatists do, but Separatists pursue such policies in cunning bad faith, whereas one might expect Federalists to oppose them in wise good faith. As things stand, looking at the NDP, notably, but also the LPC, CPC and GPC, few do.

I mention this state of affairs as an example of the self-delusion of the blinkered partisan of any position or party, with a view to highlighting those of the NDP. I'm a Liberal, just barely, but anyone who reads me would know there are few harsher critics of the LPC, its policies and personalities, than myself. I am, it seems, atypical in this regard, when I observe the behaviour of others. Much has been written on partisanship and its nature, the types of partisans, their reasons for being so, the compensation, psychological and otherwise, etc.. And it is a commonplace that any party's or movement's extremists have an outsized influence, as being the most committed, hardest-working, etc., by definition. It is also usually the case that the more ideological the party, the more committed, the more partisan its adherents. Which brings us to the curious case of the NDP.

What does the NDP, under Layton, stand for? What are its principles? What are the policies that flow from those principles?

I did a little informal survey, asking a number of NDP supporters or NDP-inclined supporters, asking them these questions. All they could say is that Layton is the leader and the NDP is for the little guy, basically.

We all understand that political parties are shorthand for identifying worldviews with which one agrees or disagrees, etc.. But here's where it gets interesting. If you observe the behaviour of NDP partisans, they behave with all the blinkered passion one would expect from partisans of an ideologically-based party, but admit they don't really have any ideology or even know or understand the party's policies.

It is a fairly unique case of ideological partisans for a party without ideology. One observes this when one tries to talk to them about the effects of the NDP's vote-splitting in 1988 or the defeat of the Martin Government in 2006, with the public policy consequences of those events. Any thinking Canadian social-democrat would normally bemoan the policy consequences of the NDP's behaviour, even were he to view the electoral results as a good thing. But that is beyond them it seems, for it would mean criticism of the leadership, which they cannot accept.

Contrast that with the behaviour of LPC, CPC, GPC, PQ etc. partisans. However strong their support, it is accompanied with policy considerations and criticisms. But none of that from the NDP partisans.

I was wondering about how it is that NDP partisans could place a few more seats over child care and aboriginal policies, or now, when they positively welcome a Harper majority, aided by the NDP's rise, if that means the NDP wins more seats, perhaps further threatening the LPC. Everyone knows that the current NDP rise is Harper's best friend is his hunt for a majority, as evidenced by the glee with which conservative partisans are playing up the NDP's rise.

Supposedly, these self-same NDP partisans are the most opposed to Harper's worldview, and the policies that will be implemented by his government should he get a majority. But it seems the NDP partisans would prefer a Harper majority if it means they can gain a significant number of seats.

This would make sense if they honestly believe the LPC and CPC are interchangeable, or if they are actually communists, and hope things get significantly worse so they may gather the alienated masses behind them to implement fundamental change for the better down the line. But neither of these possibilities seems the case, in exchanging with them and observing them.

Their politics seem reduced to that of the clan and charismatic leadership (in poli sci and other sense): "We're NDP. We're with Jack". And that's really all they have, it seems.

For those who come from the wider social-democratic tradition, and its CCF current in Canada, it is quite sad to observe. Not just because Canada's supposed social-democratic party has been reduced to the superficial plaything of its unprincipled leadership and its blinkered non-ideological partisans, but because of the real-world consequences. The NDP, on its current course, may once again bring about devastation for the vulnerable, which they will not, and cannot recognise, it seems, for the reasons noted, and a goodly number of those Canadians who will most suffer as a result will continue to vote for those who brought about their devastation.

I'll admit, I may be blind myself, since I cannot see the endgame myself, from an ideological, or social-democrat viewpoint. So the NDP replaces the LPC? So what? As in every province where the NDP is one of the two major parties, it behaves almost exactly as the LPC does, or as McGuinty's LPO does. And the GPC will then grow to occupy the NDP's current spot. And so on. And for what? In the meantime, millions of vulnerable Canadians will have died earlier, as a result of conservative policies. Power for power's sake, that for which they traditionally rebuke the LPC? Layton will soon be too old for active politics, and what point is there to the whole thing?

As a business, it makes sense, market share and all that. But then why not join the LPC to start with? Why go through all this nonsense?

Politics is a strange thing, full of damaged people, seeking validation, social status, and wealth, when observing those who practise it for itself. Just as it would be healthy for Canada to have federalists who were actually federalists, so would it be healthy to have a social democratic party that was actually a serious social democratic party.

I suppose January 25th, 2003, when the NDP turned its back on its principled traditions, as represented by decent men and women, and endorsed the postmodern emptiness of the Layton candidacy for leadership, will be viewed as an important, if dark, turning point in Canadian history. It was the moment when the Left stopped serving as counterweight to the Right, but rather became its objective ally. As some elderly Winnipeg social democrats, still doggedly NDP supporters, despite all their misgivings, acerbically described Layton to me: "that popinjay" (you have to say it with the bite of an old church-going woman from the Prairies, who was CCF when times were bad, and then NDP, through thick and thin. You've got to purse your lips, have them curl into an almost imperceptible sneer, and enunciate it with the sharpness and clarity of one brought up in the Old Canada of consonants and the Queen's English.)

Robert Michels wrote some stuff on this phenomenon. He became so disenchanted with the social-democratic movement, its partisans and the party's workings, that he left the cause of his life for a bad path, fascism, since he figured if things are all stitched up for leaders and their egos, and all the BS, why not try to get real change by cutting through the BS to adopting openly leader-centric politics.

This is the danger of empty politics as practised by empty men, people start to ask themselves if it's all self-serving BS, why participate, and if we participate, why not search for the really real, and look to extremists, or simply adopt emptiness as their own politics: if you can't beat 'em, join 'em, eh?

I disagree, obviously. I say, keep hitting 'em till you knock some sense into 'em. Because all the BS may be very amusing, but there are actual real people who suffer tremendously from the BS, as opposed to what could be achieved with serious, wise policies. But men are coherent wholes. A poser in politics is bound to be a poser in policy, and vice-versa. Parties' ideologies and resulting policies must be serious and coherent, and that is only possible if the actors themselves are such. How we get serious people into politics, I'm not sure. Never was there a more admirable man is this regard than Stéphane Dion, but would his career and what he suffered inspire many others to follow the same path?

In any event, just as no prominent member of the NDP has ever recognised the party's share of blame for 1988, or 2006, I very much doubt irritated observers will have that satisfaction should the NDP succeed in bringing about a Harper majority in 2011. It will all be seen as a great success in winning X number of additional seats, whatever the devastation for "ordinary Canadians", as they say.